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A
mAbstract
The way age-specific unemployment rates fluctuate over the business cycle differs
significantly across countries. This paper examines the effect of labor-market
institutions on the fluctuations of age-specific unemployment rates based on panel
data of 18 OECD countries between 1971 and 2008. Empirical results suggest that
the cost of the business cycle disproportionately falls on youths in countries with
stricter employment protection. This implies that a higher adjustment cost of an
existing workforce induces the employment adjustment of new entrants into the
labor market.
JEL codes: E24, J80
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Although the unemployment rate fluctuates in line with the business cycle, the fluc-
tuation of age-specific unemployment rates differs significantly across Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The way age-specific un-
employment rates fluctuate over the business cycle significantly differs across the US,
France, and Japan, as shown in the time-series plot for the 1960-2008 period in
Figure 1. First, youths’ (15-24) and adults’ (45-54) unemployment rates move in paral-
lel in the US. Business-cycle fluctuations seem to be absorbed equally across genera-
tions. Second, youths’ unemployment rate fluctuates more sharply than adults’
unemployment rate in France. This implies that employment adjustments occur more
often for youths than for adults in France. The Japanese trend lies somewhere between
those of the US and France. Shocks to the economy are equally absorbed by genera-
tions in the US, while they are intensively absorbed by younger generations in France.
To see the heterogeneity of the age distribution of unemployment-rate volatility,
adjusting for differences in the levels of unemployment rates by age groups, Table 1
reports the coefficient of variation of unemployment rates for these three countries.
Again, we find that youths’ unemployment-rate volatility relative to adults’
employment-rate volatility is higher in France than in the US or Japan.
What factors cause this international difference in the responses of age-specific un-
employment rates over the business cycle? Answering this question is particularly2012 Kawaguchi and Murao; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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Figure 1 Age-specific unemployment rates (US, France, and Japan).
Kawaguchi and Murao IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012, 1:10 Page 2 of 22
http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/10
Table 1 Coefficient of variation of the age-specific unemployment rate in three countries
15-24 25-34 45-54 15-24/45-54 25-34/45-54
France 0.49 0.57 0.58 0.84 0.99
US 0.50 0.56 1.32 0.38 0.42
Japan 0.22 0.36 0.73 0.30 0.49
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among youth across OECD countries after the 2008 financial crisis. The press release
by OECD in advance of the G20 Labor Ministers Meeting in Mexico on 17-18 May
2012 points out that the youth employment rate is higher than the general unemploy-
ment rate, citing examples of Greece and Spain, where youth unemployment is three
times higher than general unemployment rate.1 Pointing to longer-term consequences
of youth unemployment, OECD recommends that governments expand job-search as-
sistance, apprenticeship and other vocational training programs, and employment sub-
sidies for youth. It also recommends reducing the gap of employment protection
between permanent and temporary workers, and setting minimum wage not too high.
Although these policy recommendations are likely to be effective for alleviating youth
unemployment problems, determining why the burden of negative economic shock falls
disproportionately on youth in some countries in the first place can contribute to re-
moving the causes of youth unemployment.
Previous literature shows that the youths’ unemployment rate is more cyclically sensi-
tive than that of adults (Clark and Summers 1981, Alba-Ramirez 1995, Rios-Rull 1996,
Gomme et al. 2005, Bertola et al. 2007 and Jaimovich and Siu 2009). Many theoretical
and empirical investigations also account for higher unemployment rates for youths
than for adults. Research indicates that stricter employment protection or a higher
unionization rate raises the unemployment rate in general (e.g. Lazear 1990). These
rigid labor-market institutions particularly raise youths’ unemployment rate relative to
adults’ (Lazear 1990, Canziani and Petrongolo 2001, Rodriguez-Palenzuela and Jimeno-
Serrano 2002, Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2007, Kahn 2007, Leonor 2008). These prior
studies examine how employment protection or wage-setting institutions affect the re-
spective unemployment rates of youths and adults. In other words, these studies exam-
ine the long-run effect of employment protection or wage-setting institutions on the
unemployment rate of youths relative to that of adults.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing studies examine why the fluctua-
tions of age-specific unemployment rates differ across countries. It is important to
study which age groups of workers absorb the short-run macroeconomic shocks from
the point of view of inter-generational risk-sharing. Economies where younger genera-
tions disproportionately absorb macroeconomic shocks place a greater burden of the
business cycle on youths, who presumably have a lower capacity for absorbing risks be-
cause they hold less asset than other age groups, on average. Neumark (2002), Wachter
and Bender (2006) and Genda et al. (2010) report that the employment status of youths
has prolonged effects on labor-market outcomes in the long run because of the hyste-
resis. Thus, short-run macroeconomic shocks experienced when workers are young
may well have a considerable long-run effect on their welfare, and workers belonging
to different birth-year cohorts may have significantly different levels of welfare in an
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young workers.
This paper explores the extent to which labor-market institutions, such as the degree
of employment protection, affect heterogeneous responses of age-specific unemploy-
ment rates to macroeconomic shocks. We derive empirical predictions from a theore-
tical model and test them using panel data of the unemployment rate of 18 developed
countries spanning the 1971-2008 period. By regressing changes of age-specific un-
employment rates on the overall unemployment rate, the heterogeneity of responses of
age-specific unemployment rates to a macroeconomic shock is estimated. We further
examine how this heterogeneity depends on various labor-market-institution indexes,
originally published by OECD and extended by other sources.
Our results indicate that stricter employment protection amplifies the effect of the
cyclical unemployment rate on youths’ unemployment rate. This implies that the cost
of the business cycle falls disproportionately on youths in the countries with stricter
employment protection. A higher replacement rate for unemployment insurance bene-
fits seems to mitigate the cyclical sensitivity of youth unemployment rates.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a theoretical model
to derive empirical predictions on how labor-market institutions affect unemployment
rates of different age groups in different ways. Section 3 discusses the empirical stra-
tegy. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 reports the empirical results, and Section
6 provides conclusions.
2. Theoretical background
In this section, we introduce a theoretical model that analyzes firms' employment po-
licies in a dynamic setting when the adjustment of labor input is costly.
We consider a firm that operates infinitely, discounting future profit with a discount
factor. The firm produces output using LYt young workers, and LOt adult workers as
inputs. Young and adult workers are combined by the constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production technology with the elasticity of substitution σ = 1/1(1 − ρ):
Yt ¼ At LρYt þ LρOt
 1
ρ; ρ ≤ 1;
where At is the total factor productivity, which takes either a high or low value and fol-
lows a first-order Markov process. We denote transition probabilities as PH|H,PL|H,PH|L,
PL|L, where Pj|j stands for the probability of transition from state i to j. Hence, the firm
has an incentive to adjust employment, responding to productivity realization in each
period. We assume that the number of young workers in the previous period becomes
the number of adult workers at the beginning of a period. The firm bears the labor-
adjustment costs for changing the number of adult employees from this initial value, as
well as for hiring the young workers.
Given the wage rate of young workers WYt, and adult workers WOt, its profit in period
t is represented as follows:
πt ¼ At LρYt þ LρOt
 1
ρ WYtLYt WOtLOt  α LOt  LYt1ð Þ2  γ LYtð Þ2;
where α is the parameter characterizing the size of adjustment cost for adult workers
and γ is the parameter characterizing the hiring cost for young workers. Stricter
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labor unions are all captured by a higher value of α. In contrast, a generous
unemployment-insurance system may well reduce adjustment costs because existing
workers are willing to be unemployed.
In the above setting, the firm’s employment policy must be consistent with the fol-
lowing Bellman equations, with the current-state variables (At,LYt-1).
V A; LY ;1
  ¼ A LρY þ LρO 1ρ WYLY WOLO  α LO  LY ;1 2  γ LYð Þ2 þ βΕV A0; LYð Þ;
where LY,-1 is the number of youths employed in the previous period (for the initial
period, it is the number of old workers, which is exogenously given), β is a discount
factor, and A0 is productivity realization in the next period.
We solve the model numerically with the parameters in Table 2 and simulate the
economies for 10,000,000 periods. Specifically, we conduct them with three different
sets of (σ,Pi|i), each of which is calculated with three different values of α. The lower
substitutability between young and adult workers (lower σ) tends to suppress the vola-
tility of both youth and adult employment because the two factors become comple-
mentary in production and firms attempt to balance these two inputs. The lower
persistence of the shock (Pi|i) also tends to suppress the volatility of youth employment,
because the current shock is less likely to carry over into the next period and firms can-
not save adjustment costs in the next period by swinging youth employment today.
We calculate the mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation (CV) of the
simulated paths of youth and adult employment. Then, we calculate the relative CV be-
tween young and adult workers. Results are presented in Table 3. In the table, all three
cases (i)-(iii) show that with higher α, the relative CVs of the young workers mark a
higher value. That is, the higher adjustment cost of existing workers makes firms adjust
labor input by reducing new hires from the labor market. As expected, young and old
employment becomes less volatile in cases of the lower substitutability of youth and
adult workers (lower σ) and higher uncertainty (lower Pi|i), as evidenced by lower
standard deviations for both cases.
More volatile labor demand for youths leads to higher volatility of youths’ unemploy-
ment rate, with some degree of rigidity in the wage setting. To capture the heteroge-
neity of wage rigidity across countries, we control for the difference in wage-setting
institutions. In the following empirical sections, we test whether the higher adjustment
costs of adult workers as compared with young workers results in a higher volatility of
youths’ employment relative to that of adults.Table 2 Parameters of the dynamic stochastic labor-adjustment model
Discount factor β=0.98
Technology parameter for high and low economic condition AH=0.4,AL=0.3
Wages for young and old workers WY=0.05,WO=0.05
Elasticity of substitution between young and adult workers σ=2.0 or 1.0
Parameter of adjustment cost of adult workers α=0.005, 0.010, or 0.015
Parameter of hiring cost of young workers γ=0.005
Persistence oftechnology shock PH|H= PL|L = 0.75 or 0.50
Table 3 Simulated employment level
Case (i) Baseline: σ=2.0,Pi|i= 0.75
Mean S.D. C.V.
Young Old Young Old Young Old Young/old
α=0.005 0.3657 0.0819 0.0550 0.0653 0.1504 0.7971 0.1886
α=0.010 0.3475 0.1924 0.0723 0.0875 0.2081 0.4547 0.4576
α=0.015 0.3466 0.2418 0.0748 0.0874 0.2158 0.3613 0.5972
Case (ii) Lower substitutability between youth and adult: σ=1.0,Pi|i= 0.75
Mean S.D. C.V.
Young Old Young Old Young Old Young/Old
α=0.005 0.8745 0.8582 0.0171 0.0198 0.0195 0.0231 0.8465
α=0.010 0.8743 0.8657 0.0159 0.0170 0.0182 0.0197 0.9257
α=0.015 0.8737 0.8680 0.0154 0.0161 0.0177 0.0185 0.9543
Case (iii) High uncertainty (i.e. shock is less persistent): σ=2.0,Pi|i= 0.50
Mean S.D. C.V.
Young Old Young Old Young Old Young/Old
0.361 0.0725 0.1136 0.6291 0.1136 0.6291 0.1805
α=0.010 0.3441 0.1871 0.0472 0.0534 0.1372 0.2855 0.4805
α=0.015 0.3452 0.2406 0.0471 0.0517 0.1365 0.2148 0.6356
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Theoretical predictions in the previous section emphasize the role of adjustment costs
on the labor-demand fluctuation by age group. The adjustment cost depends on various
labor-market institutions. Stricter employment-protection legislation increases the legal
cost of employment adjustment. Higher union density also may increase the adjustment
cost, because union workers request higher compensation for employment adjustments
backed by their strong bargaining power. In contrast, a generous unemployment insu-
rance system may well reduce the adjustment cost, because a worker who currently
holds a job does not have to go through hardship before landing a new job when he is
fired.
The degree to which the labor-demand fluctuation is transmitted to the unemployment
rate fluctuation depends on wage rigidities. Thus wage-setting institutions, which differ
across countries, may well affect unemployment rates by age group. Hence, we control for
wage-setting institutions as well.
Shock to the labor market is approximated by the unemployment rate defined over
all age groups, and the relation between the overall unemployment rate and the age-
specific unemployment rate is examined. In particular, we specify a model as follows.
△ UEageit
  ¼ β0 þ△ UEoverallit β1 þ INSt1β2 þ

△ UEoverallit










β5 þ cagei þ eageit ;
ð1Þ
where the age groups of 15-24, 25-34, and 45-54 are indexed by age; countries are
indexed by i; years are indexed by t.; INS is the vector of seven labor-market institution
indexes, which are normalized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1; Y/Pop is the ratio
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In equation (1), the coefficient on the overall unemployment rate of all ages identifies
the impact of the overall change of the unemployment rate on the change of the age-
specific unemployment rate. The coefficients on lagged labor-market institutions iden-
tify the long-run effects of labor-market institutions, such as firing restrictions, on the
age-specific unemployment-rate change. The coefficients on the interaction terms be-
tween the labor-market institution index and the overall unemployment rate change
identify how the effects of overall labor-market shock on age-specific unemployment
rates depend on labor-market institutions, such as firing restrictions, unemployment in-
surance, and wage-setting institutions.
Equation (1) includes the change of the fraction of the young and young adult popu-
lation to the total population to allow for a possibility that young workers belonging to
a cohort of a larger population size may have harder time finding a job, which is con-
ceptualized as the cohort-crowding effect (Welch 1979, Korenman and Neumark 2000
and Shimer 2001).
Since the overall unemployment rate is the weighted average of age-specific un-
employment rates, the overall unemployment rate is an obvious endogenous variable.
This endogeneity is circumvented by instrumenting the overall unemployment rate by
the GDP growth rate lagged one year, relying on Okun’s law (Lee 2000). We estimate
the above equation with a random-effect IV model, assuming unobservable heteroge-
neity cagei is not correlated with the regressors.
In addition, we run regressions with the difference of the unemployment rate change
by age group as dependent variables to quantify the difference of the coefficients across
age groups.
△ UEyoungit
 △ UEadultit 
¼ β0 þ△ UEoverallit
 
β1 þ INSt1β2 þ

△ UEoverallit








β5 þ cagei þ eageit ;
ð2Þ
The parameter β1 captures the excess sensitivity of the youth unemployment rate
over the adult unemployment rate to the overall business cycle, captured by the change
of the overall unemployment rate. The parameter vector β3 identifies if a particular
labor-market institution amplifies the sensitivity of the youth unemployment rate over
the adult unemployment rate to the overall unemployment rate.
4. Data
We build the cross-country time-series dataset from two sources. First, we draw age-
specific and overall unemployment rates and population from the OECD Stat Extracts.2
Age groups of our concern are 15-24, 25-34, and 45-54. Second, we draw labor-
market-institution indices from the CEP-OECD Institution Dataset, which is compiled
by Center for Economic Performance of London School of Economics (Nickell 2006).
This dataset is constructed on the basis of an earlier work by Nickell and Nunziata
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The CEP-OECD Institution Dataset contains the data of 20 OECD countries from
1960 to 2004. Based on the original data set, we construct our sample covering the
1971 to 2008 period of 18 countries, because some variables are not available for the
whole period and all countries. Since there are no data of the union-coverage rate for
Ireland and of population for Switzerland, we exclude these countries from the analysis.
After 2005, employment protection legislation (EPL) and union coverage are extended,
based on the OECD labor-market statistics database for the period until 2008. The
Benefit Replacement Ratio of unemployment insurance is extended to 2007 based on
Benefits and Wages: OECD Indicators to 2008.3 For other institutional variables after
2005, the values of 2005 are extrapolated.
Regression analyses are conducted with the following labor-market-institution indi-
ces: the Employment Protection Legislation (hereafter, EPL) Index, the Benefit Replace-
ment Ratio Index, the Benefit Duration Index, the Union Density Ratio, the Union
Coverage Ratio, the Bargaining Centralization Index, and the Bargaining Coordination
Index. Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 tabulate the time series of each index for each coun-
try. Details of these indexes are summarized as follows.
1. The EPL Index takes a higher value if employment protection legislation is more
stringent. This index is essentially based on Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), which in
turn is based on Lazear (1990) and OECD (1994). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
extend an EPL measure of OECD (1994) by connecting with Lazear (1990). In
particular, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use a measure named version 1, which is the
longest series of the three measures published by the OECD. Here we only briefly
explain the method for constructing the OECD (1994) version 1 measure (See Nickell
2006 and OECD 1994 for more about the construction of version 1 of the EPL Index).
The OECD indicators of employment protection measure the procedures and costs
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in
hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary-work agency contracts. The indicators are
compiled from several items covering three different aspects of employment
protection: individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts, additional costs for
collective dismissals, and regulation of temporary contracts. The measure is an
unweighted average of the sub-indicators of regular and temporary contracts. These
sub-indicators are aggregates of basis measures, which take a value of 0 to 6.4
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) construct their EPL index for every five years, and then
Nickell (2006) interpolates them. In 2005, the US marked 0.07, France marked 1.00,
and Japan marked 0.60.
2. The Benefit Replacement Ratio Index summarizes a benefit replacement ratio for
various conditions. For many countries, the benefit replacement ratio depends on
family structures and earnings before losing a job. The OECD calculates the
replacement rates for the first five years of unemployment for three typical family
structures and for two earnings levels, and takes the average of the figures. In 2005,
the US marked 14, France marked 39, and Japan marked 13.
3. The Benefit Duration Index captures the level of benefits available in later years of
a spell relative to those available in the first year. This index measures how much the
Table 4 Employment protection legislation index (five-year intervals)
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Australia 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.40
Austria 0.73 0.73 0.63
Belgium 1.07 1.07 1.07 0.73 0.73
Canada 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
Denmark 0.77 0.77 0.47 0.47 0.47
Finland 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.72 0.70 0.67
France 0.57 0.84 0.93 0.93 1.00 1.0 1.00 1.00
Germany 0.83 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.03 0.83 0.80
Ireland 0.26 0.3 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.37
Italy 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.86 0.63
Japan 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.60 0.60
Netherland 0.90 0.90 0.70 0.70
New Zealand 0.30 0.30 0.50 0.50
Norway 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.87 0.87
Portugal 1.08 1.34 1.40 1.37 1.28 1.23 1.16
Spain 1.33 1.29 1.27 1.27 1.04 0.97 1.03
Sweden 0 0.23 0.86 1.17 1.17 1.17 0.83 0.73 0.73
Switzerland 0.33 0.37 0.37
United Kingdom 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.23
US 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Note: Index of strictness of employment protection legislation, which is increasing in the degree of employment protection legislation.



















Table 5 Benefit duration index (five-year intervals)
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Australia 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.00
Austria 0.71 0.7 0.72
Belgium 0.8 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.86
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.62 0.61 1 0.90 0.80
Finland 0 0 0.66 0.65 0.51 0.5 0.56 0.56 0.58
France 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.36 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.50
Germany 0.57 0.62 0.62 0.6 0.6 0.59 0.6 0.60
Ireland 0.42 0.43 0.5 0.75 0.88 1.00
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.44 0.45
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Netherland 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.66
New Zealand 1.04 1.04 1 1.0
Norway 0.37 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.6 0.38
Portugal 0 0 0.05 0.33 0.38 0.52 0.46
Spain 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.44 0.42 0.41
Sweden 0 0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02
Switzerland 0.16 0.3 0.20
United Kingdom 0.72 0.68 0.73 0.88 0.84
US 0 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.20
Note: Index of the level of benefits available in the later years of spell relative to those available in the first year.
Source: Nickell (2006).
Kawaguchi and Murao IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012, 1:10 Page 10 of 22
http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/10benefit decreases along with unemployment spell. The index is calculated as 0.6*brr23/
brr1+0.4*brr45/brr1, where brr1 refers to benefits of the first year, brr23 the second
and the third years, and brr45 the fourth and the fifth years. This index takes 0 if the
unemployment insurance benefit ends at or within 52 weeks of an unemployment spell
and takes a positive value if the unemployment insurance benefit continues after 52
weeks. In 2005, the US marked 0.20, France marked 0.50, and Japan marked 0.00.
4. The Union Density Ratio (%) is a ratio of the number of union memberships over
the employed population. In 2005, the US marked 12.0%, France marked 7.7%, and
Japan marked 18.8%.
5. The Union Coverage Ratio (%) refers to a ratio of the number of workers covered
by collective agreements over the employed population. A high value of this index
implies that more workers are covered by agreements by collective bargaining between
employers and unions. In some European countries, these agreements set a legally
binding minimum wage for all employers. Therefore, the gap between union density
and the union coverage ratio can be substantial, and the extreme example is
France, where about 95% of workers are covered by union agreements,but less than
10% of workers are union members (Card et al. 2003). The latest year of the
available index is 2000, when the US marked 14%, France marked 93%, and Japan
marked 18%.
6. The Centralization Index takes a higher value if the bargaining process is more
centralized. Bargaining may occur at several different levels, and this fact indicates the
degree of centralization. The index is taken from Table 3.5 of OECD (2004).
Table 6 Benefit replacement ratio
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Australia 23.5 23.5 25.5 27 24.7 22
Austria 32.5 32.2 32
Belgium 43.1 41.8 38.7 38.7 41
Canada 18.1 19.3 19.3 19.3 15.3 12
Denmark 53.1 51.7 64.9 56 54
Finland 4.2 6.7 23.9 25.1 34.4 36.4 35.8 34.1 35
France 25.6 26.3 27.7 34.4 37.3 37.4 40.2 39
Germany 29.4 29.1 29.7 28.3 28.2 26.3 28.2 24
Ireland 21.3 28.3 28.2 26.3 32.5 34
Italy 2 1.9 0.8 0.4 2.6 19.3 34.3 33
Japan 12.7 13.4 8.7 10.3 10 10.2 10.7 13
Netherland 54.3 52.3 52.5 35
New Zealand 31.3 27.1 28.5 26
Norway 7.6 24.5 38.8 38.8 38.8 41.7 58
Portugal 5.4 8 21.7 33 35.4 42.9 40
Spain 21.3 24.6 34.4 33.7 39 37.1 35
Sweden 5.2 6.6 22 25.1 27.9 29.2 26.9 24 39
Switzerland 29.5 37.4 33
United Kingdom 20.7 17.7 17.8 16.6 16
US 7.1 9.1 10.3 12.1 13.1 14.7 11.2 11.9 13.5 14
Note: Average number across the first five years of unemployment for three family situations and two money levels (%).
Source:Nickell (2006) and OECD statistics.
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2. Combination of industry and company/plant levels, with an important share of
employees covered by company bargains.
3. Industry-level predominant.
4. Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level associations.
5. Central-level agreements of overriding importance.
In these decades, there is no country in which bargaining processes became more
centralized, while several countries, such as New Zealand, Switzerland, and
Denmark, became more decentralized. In countries where at least two years differ
from the period’s modal value, the period average is reported.
The latest available year of the index is 2000, when the US marked 1.0, France
marked 2.0, and Japan marked 1.0.7. The Coordination Index summarizes the degree of coordination in bargaining
processes on the employer’s as well as the union’s side. The index takes a higher value if
the degree of coordination is higher.5 This index is taken from Table 3.5 of OECD (2004).1. Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no coordination by upper-level
associations.
2. Fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting,
3. Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate co-
ordination among major bargaining actors.
Table 7 Union density (five-year intervals)
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Australia 49.9 50 46.5 35.3 24.5 21.9
Austria 41.1 36.5 33.3
Belgium 52.4 53.9 55.7 55.6 52.9
Canada 34.9 35.4 34.4 33.8 30.9 27.8
Denmark 78.2 75.3 77 74.4 71.7
Finland 38.3 51.3 65.3 69.4 69.1 72.3 79.2 76.2 72.4
France 21.7 22.2 18.3 13.6 10.1 9.8 9.7 7.7
Germany 32 34.6 34.9 34.7 31.2 29.2 25 21.7
Ireland 55.3 54.1 51.1 47.1 37.8 34.0
Italy 37 48 49.6 42.5 38.8 38.1 34.9 33.6
Japan 35.1 34.5 31.1 28.8 25.4 24 21.5 18.8
Netherland 25.5 25.7 23.1 21.0
New Zealand 51 27.6 22.7 20.9
Norway 53.8 58.4 57.5 58.6 57.3 54.3 54.9
Portugal 59.7 54.6 31.7 25.4 23.5 21.2
Spain 8.9 11 16.3 13.9 15.2
Sweden 66.3 67.7 74.5 78 81.3 81.5 86.6 80.3 76.5
Switzerland 22.9 19.4 19.3
United Kingdom 46.2 39.3 32.9 31.2 28.4
US 30.9 28.2 27.4 25.3 22.1 17.4 15.3 14.2 12.9 12.0
Note: Union density is defined as the ratio of union membership over total employment (%).
Source: Nickell (2006) and OECD labor market statistics database.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/104. One of the following four categories from a) to d):a) informal coordination of industry and firm-level bargaining by (multiple)
peak associations;
b) Coordinated bargaining by peak confederations, including government-
sponsored negotiations(tripartite agreements, social pacts), or government
imposition of wage schedules;
c) regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration and /or
bargainingco-ordination by large firms; or
d) government wage arbitration.5. One of the following two categories a) or b):a) informal coordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing
union confederation; or
b) coordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition
of a wage schedule/freeze, with apeace obligation.The latest year of the available index is 2000, when the US marked 1.0, France
marked 2.0, and Japan marked 4.0.
In general, centralization may not necessarily mean coordination or vice versa
(OECD 1997). First, if there is a significant discrepancy between the individual
Table 8 Union coverage ratio
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Australia 84 85 81.5 80.5 83
Austria 98.8 98
Belgium 90 91.5 90.5 93
Canada 38.5 39 38 35.3 32
Denmark 74 71 71.3 83
Finland 95 95 95 94 95 94 94.7 93
France 84 92 92.5 94.7 93
Germany 90 90 87 90 86.5 88 68
Ireland
Italy 88 85 84 85 83 82.2 83
Japan 28 25.5 23 20.5 18
Netherland 73 84.7 83
New Zealand 65 30.5 28
Norway 65 71.5 70 71.5 70.5 73
Portugal 71.5 73.8 76 73 83
Spain 65.5 70 74.5 78.8 83
Sweden 83 83.8 84.5 89.7 93
Switzerland 51.3 43
United Kingdom 62 48.5 38.8 33
US 29 27 27 24 23.5 21 18 16.5 14
Note: Ratio of workers covered by collective agreements (%).
Values after year 2000 are extrapolated using the value in 2000 in the course of estimation.
Source: Nickell (2006).
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/10firm-level negotiated wage and the globally negotiated wage, which is called wage
drift, the extent of coordination may be weaker despite the centralized wage set-
ting. Second, institutions such as pattern-setting may promote coordination, while
it is also substitutable for institutions that are intended to promote centralization.6
There are several different claims regarding the effects of centralization and co-
ordination on unemployment rates. Nickell (1997) refers to the notion of OECD
(1994) Table 5.16 that coordinative arrangements lower wages, while centralized
arrangements do not, and summarizes that the negative effects of unionization on
employment are mitigated by coordination. In contrast, Calmfors and Driffill
(1988) claim that the relation between centralization and employment is U-
shaped, while Driffill (2006) later find that highly coordinated or centralized bar-
gaining leads to wage restraint and a low unemployment rate.
Time-series, cross-section values of these indexes are summarized in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9 and 10. The indexes do not vary much over time within a country; thus the estima-
tion relies mainly on the cross-country variation of labor-market institutions.7 The de-
scriptive statistics of the analysis sample are summarized in Table 11. Since the values
of the index of labor markets do not carry information in themselves, we normalize all
the indexes for the purpose of comparing the relative importance of institutions in de-
termining the change of unemployment rates.
Table 9 Bargaining centralisation index
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Australia 4 4 2.8 2 2
Austria 3 3
Belgium 3 3 3 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 3 3 2.4 2
Finland 5 5 4.4 4.6 5 5 5
France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ireland 4 1.9 3.4 4 4
Italy 2 2 2.9 2.6 2 2 2
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherland 3 3 3
New Zealand 1.8 1 1
Norway 4.5 3.9 4.1 4.5 4.5 4.5
Portugal 4.4 3.4 3 3.6 4 4
Spain 4.4 4 3.7 3.2 3 3
Sweden 5 5 4.7 3.6 3 3 3
Switzerland 2 2
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1
US 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Index of the degree of bargaining centralization. The index is increasing in the degree of centralization.
Values after year 2000 are extrapolated using the value in 2000 in the course of estimation.
Source:Nickell (2006).
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Table 11 displays descriptive statistics of the analysis data. The data set includes obser-
vations from 18 countries between 1971 and 2008. Were all observations included,
there would be 684 observations, but because of missing observations, there are 507
observations in the data set. The mean youth (15-24) unemployment rate is about 14%
and higher than that of prime age groups (25-34, 7% and 45-54, 4%). Each institution
index is normalized by mean and standard deviation so that the effects of each institu-
tion on unemployment rates are comparable.
Table 12 reports the estimation results of equations (1) and (2). Columns (1) through (3)
report the results for age-specific unemployment rate changes among 15-24 year olds,
25-34 year olds, and 45-54 year olds, as dependent variables. Column (4) is the result with
the difference of the unemployment rate change between 15-24 year olds and 45-
54 year olds as the dependent variable. Column (5) shows the result with the difference be-
tween the unemployment rate change of 15-24 year olds and that of 45-54 year olds as the
dependent variable.
The coefficients of the overall unemployment rate are positive in each of the age groups.
The estimated coefficients are larger for younger workers than adult workers, indicating that
youths’ unemployment rate is more procyclical than adults’ unemployment rate.
Estimation results suggest that labor-market institution indexes, such as firing restric-
tions, unemployment system, and wage-setting institutions, are broadly irrelevant to
unemployment growth.
Table 10 Bargaining coordination index
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Australia 4.3 4.2 2.8 2 2
Austria 4 4
Belgium 4 4 4.3 4.5
Canada 1.8 1 1 1 1
Denmark 3.6 3.4 3.6 4
Finland 5 5 4.4 4.6 5 5 5
France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ireland 4 1.9 3.4 4 4
Italy 2 2 2.9 2.6 2.6 3.6 4
Japan 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Netherland 4 4 4
New Zealand 2.2 1 1
Norway 4.5 3.9 4.1 4.5 4.5 4.5
Portugal 4.4 3.4 3 3.6 4 4
Spain 4.4 4 3.7 3.2 3 3
Sweden 4 4 3.7 3.2 3 3 3
Switzerland 4 4
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1
US 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Index of the degree of bargaining coordination. The index is increasing in the degree of coordination.
Values after year 2000 are extrapolated using the value in 2000 in the course of estimation.
Source:Nickell (2006).
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unemployment rate identify the heterogeneous impacts of the macroeconomic shock
on age-specific unemployment rates by institutional setting. We first examine the
results for employment protection. Table 12 Column 1 shows that stricter employment
protection amplifies the effect of overall shock on youth unemployment, while it has
no effect on that of young adult and adult workers, according to Columns 2 and 3. This
implies that firing restrictions mitigate the cyclical fluctuation of young adult and adult
unemployment, but they do not mitigate it for youth. This result is consistent with
the theoretical result of the previous section. This also well explains why the unemploy-
ment rates of all age groups move simultaneously in the US, where firing restrictions
are less stringent, while youths’ unemployment rate fluctuates more than that of adults
in France, where firing restrictions are more stringent.
Notable results other than that of employment protection legislation (EPL) are coeffi-
cients of the interaction terms between the overall unemployment rate and the benefit
replacement ratio. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant for
youths, but it is positive while not statistically significant for young adults and adults.
Put differently, the higher benefit replacement ratio reduces the difference of the un-
employment rate sensitivity to macro shocks between youths and adults.
Given that adult workers are more likely to be employed and so are more likely to
receive benefits from unemployment insurance, the above empirical results are consist-
ent with the assertion that a higher replacement rate makes unemployment acceptable
Table 11 Descriptive statistics, 1971-2008, 18 countries
Variable mean s.d. min max
Unemployment rate for 15-24 13.855 6.744 0.648 39.267
Unemployment rate for 25-34 6.605 3.570 0.392 21.963
Unemployment rate for 45-54 4.365 2.384 0.000 14.013
Population 15-24 / Population 15-55 (%) 24.902 5.555 17.783 34.177
Population 25-34 / Population 15-55 (%) 26.894 1.856 17.783 33.956
GDP growth rate lagged one year 0.021 0.018 −0.080 0.080
Employment rate for 15-24 52.033 11.854 26.804 75.023
Employment rate for 25-34 87.009 4.271 72.463 96.910
Employment rate for 45-54 86.865 3.687 75.000 96.391
Employment Protection Legislation Index(EPL Index) 0.00 1.00 −1.803 1.920
Benefit duration ratio 0.00 1.00 −1.429 1.738
Benefit replacement ratio 0.00 1.00 −1.993 15.961
Union density 0.00 1.00 −1.583 2.210
Union contract coverage rate 0.00 1.00 −2.203 1.172
Union centralization index 0.00 1.00 −1.307 1.920
Union coordination index 0.00 1.00 −1.632 1.451
Note: Number of observations is 507, except for GDP growth rate lagged one year. Number of observations for GDP
growth rate lagged one year is 489. Each institution index is normalized. The unemployment rate of Norway is 0% for
1973, 1974, 1977, 1979.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/10for adult workers, while empirical results on this effect are mixed (Atkinson and
Micklewright 1991).
The relative youth cohort size and the relative young-adult cohort size are negatively
correlated with the unemployment rate of the young, though neither relation is statisti-
cally significant. This result is consistent with findings by Korenman and Neumark
(2000) that the share of youth has little impact on youths’ unemployment rate in OECD
countries between 1970 and 1994.
6. Effects of industry composition on the volatility of the unemployment rate
The difference in the volatility of the age-specific unemployment rate may be a conse-
quence of the fact that young and older workers are in different industries that are sub-
ject to different business-cycle effects. The employment share in manufacturing sectors
decreases in all OECD countries between 1970 and 2003, but the speeds of transition
are different across countries (Pilat et al. 2006). Youth employment can be concentrated
in the service sector in countries that experience a rapid contraction of the manufacturing
sector, given that the decrease of the employment share in the manufacturing sector is
more significant among youths than adults. This difference in industry composition of
employment between youths and adultsinduces a difference in the volatility of employ-
ment if employment in some industries is more sensitive to the business cycle than em-
ployment in other industries. In this case, if the age-specific industry compositions are
correlated with the index of labor-market institutions across countries, the estimates in
the previous section could be biased.
Indeed, Filardo and Andrew (1997) claims that the manufacturing sector may well be
more susceptible to the business cycle than the service sector because the product demand
is more volatile due to the durable and tradable nature of its product. Filardo and Andrew
Table 12 The impact of overall unemployment rate growth on age-specific unemployment rate growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ΔUE15-24, t ΔUE25-34, t ΔUE45-54, t ΔUE15-24, t -ΔUE45-54, t ΔUE25-34, t -ΔUE45-,54, t
Δ Unemployment rateall ages, t 1.739 (0.137) 1.185 (0.050) 0.724 (0.051) 1.015 (0.162) 0.460 (0.075)
Employment protection legislationt-1 −0.004 (0.094) −0.005 (0.034) 0.010 (0.035) −0.014 (0.111) −0.014 (0.051)
Benefit durationt-1 0.064 (0.070) −0.007 (0.025) −0.028 (0.026) 0.092 (0.083) 0.021 (0.038)
Benefit replacement ratiot-1 −0.218 (0.152) 0.031 (0.055) 0.085 (0.057) −0.303 (0.180) −0.054 (0.083)
Union densityt-1 0.060 (0.062) −0.031 (0.022) −0.007 (0.023) 0.067 (0.073) −0.024 (0.034)
Union coveraget-1 −0.019 (0.093) 0.003 (0.034) 0.003 (0.035) −0.022 (0.110) −0.000 (0.051)
Centralizationt-1 0.086 (0.098) −0.023 (0.035) −0.019 (0.037) 0.104 (0.116) −0.004 (0.054)
Coordination t-1 −0.081 (0.083) 0.031 (0.030) −0.009 (0.031) −0.072 (0.098) 0.040 (0.046)
Employment protection legislationt-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.402 (0.170) 0.023 (0.061) −0.125 (0.063) 0.527 (0.201) 0.148 (0.093)
Benefit durationt-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.146 (0.145) −0.092 (0.052) −0.022 (0.054) 0.168 (0.171) −0.070 (0.079)
Benefit replacement ratiot-1×ΔUEall ages, t −0.698 (0.380) 0.155 (0.138) 0.210 (0.142) −0.907 (0.450) −0.055 (0.208)
Union densityt-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.005 (0.098) 0.079 (0.036) −0.023 (0.037) 0.028 (0.116) 0.103 (0.054)
Union coveraget-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.060 (0.281) −0.016 (0.102) −0.022 (0.105) 0.082 (0.332) 0.005 (0.154)
Centralizationt-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.246 (0.332) −0.214 (0.120) −0.009 (0.124) 0.255 (0.392) −0.205 (0.182)
Coordinationt-1×ΔUEall ages, t −0.332 (0.367) 0.135 (0.133) 0.058 (0.137) −0.389 (0.434) 0.078 (0.201)
Δln(15-24 population) −3.906 (3.235) 1.799 (1.172) −1.926 (1.207) −1.981 (3.828) 3.725 (1.772)
Δln(25-34 population) −3.702 (2.756) −0.429 (0.999) 0.160 (1.028) −3.863 (3.261) −0.590 (1.510)
Constant 7.663 (5.250) −1.350 (1.902) 1.765 (1.958) 5.898 (6.212) −3.115 (2.876)
Observations 489 489 489 489 489
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each institution index is computed as the deviation from the mean over standard error. All specifications include year dummy variables.
Dependent variable : Δ(Unemployment rate)specific age,t.
Endogenous variables: Δ(Unemployment rate)all ages,t and its interactions with labor market institution indexes.
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than in the service sector over the business cycle using US data. If this result carries over to
OECD countries in general, we have to be concerned about the effects of different industrial
compositions across age groups on the estimation results in the previous section. To ad-
dress this concern, we examine if the effect of lagged GDP growth on the unemployment
rate is stronger in countries where the share of manufacturing employment is high. The re-
sult of the regression appears in Table 13. While a one-percent-higher lagged GDP growth
rate reduces the unemployment rate by 0.37 percent, the size of its effect does not depend
on the share of employment in the manufacturing sector in a statistically significant way.
Based upon this estimation result, we conclude that the effect of industrial composition on
the age-specific unemployment rate is limited.7. Unemployment vs. Non-employment
Literature argues that the distinction between unemployment and out-of-labor-force is
vague and dependent on the policy environment (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991). For in-
stance, long-term unemployed workers may quit their job-search when their unemployment
benefits expire, while they may continue job-search if the benefit spell is indefinite and the
insurance requires job-search as a condition for receiving the benefit. In this case, indivi-
duals not in employment are more likely to be classified as unemployed in countries with
more generous unemployment insurance. In addition, recent studies in the US and Europe
report that unemployed workers make claims for disability insurance instead of unemploy-
ment insurance because of its generosity (Black et al. 2002, Autor and Duggan 2003, Rege
et al. 2009 and Bratsberg et al. 2010). Since recipients of disability insurance are classified as
out-of-labor-force instead of unemployed, the unemployment rate would be smaller in
countries with a generous disability insurance system. To address a concern that the results
in the previous section depend critically on the usage of the unemployment rate instead of
the employment rate, we estimate exactly the same equation by using the employment rate
in place of the unemployment rate as a dependent variable.
The regression results are reported in Table 14. When the overall employment
rate increases by 1 percentage point, the employment rate of 15-24 year olds
increases by 1.478 percentage points, the employment rate of 25-34 year olds
increases by 1.143 percentage points, while the employment rate of 45-54
increases by only 0.612 percentage points. The fact that the youth employment




Manufacturing sector employment share 0.040 (1.522)
Δln(GDPt-1)×manufacturing sector employment share −28.199 (107.513)
Constant 0.636 (0.346)
Observations 234
Number of countries 17
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 14 The impact of overall employment rate growth on age-specific employment rate growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ΔE15-24, t ΔE25-34, t ΔE45-54, t ΔE15-24, t -ΔE45-,54, t ΔE25-34, t -ΔE45-,54, t
Δ Unemployment rateall ages, t 1.478 (0.132) 1.143 (0.090) 0.612 (0.097) 0.866 (0.187) 0.531 (0.132)
Employment protection legislationt-1 −0.193 (0.112) 0.051 (0.076) 0.004 (0.082) −0.197 (0.159) 0.048 (0.112)
Benefit durationt-1 −0.134 (0.091) 0.121 (0.062) 0.018 (0.067) −0.151 (0.130) 0.104 (0.091)
Benefit replacement ratiot-1 0.100 (0.123) −0.140 (0.084) −0.081 (0.091) 0.181 (0.175) −0.059 (0.123)
Union densityt-1 −0.060 (0.074) 0.081 (0.051) −0.017 (0.055) −0.043 (0.105) 0.099 (0.074)
Union coveraget-1 0.148 (0.113) −0.057 (0.077) −0.021 (0.083) 0.169 (0.160) −0.036 (0.113)
Centralizationt-1 0.050 (0.116) 0.145 (0.080) −0.005 (0.086) 0.055 (0.166) 0.150 (0.117)
Coordinationt-1 0.085 (0.124) −0.177 (0.085) 0.090 (0.092) −0.005 (0.177) −0.267 (0.124)
Employment protection legislationt-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.160 (0.153) −0.199 (0.104) −0.222 (0.113) 0.382 (0.218) 0.023 (0.153)
Benefit durationt-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.073 (0.129) −0.213 (0.088) −0.016 (0.095) 0.089 (0.183) −0.197 (0.129)
Benefit replacement ratiot-1×ΔUEall ages, t −0.216 (0.261) 0.484 (0.178) 0.272 (0.193) −0.488 (0.371) 0.212 (0.261)
Union densityt-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.058 (0.092) −0.004 (0.063) −0.081 (0.067) 0.140 (0.130) 0.077 (0.092)
Union coveraget-1×ΔUEall ages, t −0.352 (0.236) 0.229 (0.161) 0.167 (0.174) −0.520 (0.336) 0.062 (0.236)
Centralizationt-1×ΔUEall ages, t 0.250 (0.361) −0.431 (0.247) 0.190 (0.266) 0.060 (0.514) −0.620 (0.361)
Coordinationt-1×ΔUEall ages, t −0.112 (0.376) 0.313 (0.257) −0.239 (0.277) 0.127 (0.535) 0.552 (0.376)
Δln(15-24 population) 1.855 (3.473) 1.180 (2.372) 7.514 (2.561) −5.659 (4.941) −6.334 (3.475)
Δln(25-34 population) 1.664 (3.177) −0.382 (2.170) −16.062 (2.343) 17.726 (4.519) 15.680 (3.179)
Constant −3.899 (5.819) −0.950 (3.974) 8.398 (4.291) −12.296 (8.278) −9.348 (5.822)
Observations 489 489 489 489 489
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each institution index is computed as the deviation from the mean over standard error. All specifications include year dummy variables.
Independent variable : Δ(Employment rate)specific age,t.
Macroeconomic shock: Δ(Employment rate)all ages,t.
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employment protection legislation (EPL) is positive though not statistically signifi-
cant. This positive coefficient implies that stricter EPL amplifies the fluctuation of
youth employment, but its effect is weaker than the effect on the unemployment
rate. In contrast, stricter EPL reduces the fluctuation of the employment rate for
both 25-34 and 45-54 year olds, and these effects are statistically significant.
Hence, stricter EPL makes the youth employment rate more volatile than the
adult employment rate, and the difference of the coefficients is statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% level. Therefore, the result that stricter EPL makes the youth un-
employment rate more volatile than the adult unemployment rate carries over to
the analysis of the employment rate.
The interaction terms of the overall employment rate and the benefit replacement ra-
tion (BRR) are negative for youths and positive for young adults and adults (25-34 and
45-54), though only the coefficient for young adult is statistically significant. This result
weakly suggests that generous unemployment benefits make non-employment of young
adults and adults more sensitive to the business cycle and make that of young adults
less sensitive. Again, results obtained for the unemployment rate weakly carries over to
the analysis based on the employment rate.
Overall, results based on the employment rate confirm the robustness of results
based on the unemployment rate.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically explore the effect of labor-market institutions on cyc-
lical variations of age-specific unemployment rates. A theoretical model with a nu-
merical simulation suggests that a firing restriction has the heterogeneous impacts of
a macroeconomic shock on the fluctuation of age-specific labor demand. In particu-
lar, a high adjustment cost of adult workers amplifies the cyclical variation of labor
demand for young workers, while it mitigates the fluctuation of such demand for
adult workers.
Our empirical analysis from 18 OECD countries over 1971-2008 shows that the firing
restriction amplifies the cyclical fluctuation of the unemployment rate for youths, but
not for adults. This implies that macroeconomic shocks are disproportionately
absorbed by younger workers rather than older workers in economies with stricter fi-
ring restrictions. The other notable result is that macroeconomic shocks are less likely
to be absorbed by young workers in economies with a generous unemployment insu-
rance system, represented by a high benefit-replacement ratio.
Previous literature has shown that youths’ unemployment rate is more cyclically sen-
sitive than that of adults. Another strand of literature has shown that employment
protection and wage-setting institutions tend to increase young workers' long-run un-
employment rate. On top of that existing knowledge, this paper adds a new finding that a
stricter firing restriction disproportionately insulates older workers from macroeconomic
shocks at the cost of a fluctuation in younger workers’ unemployment rate. Our results
suggest the importance of paying attention to intergenerational risk sharing in discussions
about designing labor-market institutions.
Even if younger workers are more likely to absorb the cost of the business cycle,
no particular generation incurs more cost than others if employment status changes
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ent over a life cycle, the experience of unemployment at youth may significantly de-
crease the life-time welfare of a specific cohort. Hence, using cross-country panel
data, calculating an average unemployment rate over the life cycle for each cohort,
and examining how its inter-cohort variation depends on labor-market institutions
are interesting areas for future research.Endnotes
1OECD data released in advance of the meeting areavailable from following web page.
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/g20labourministersmustfocusonyoungjobseekers.htm
(Viewed on August 25, 2012).
2http://stats.oecd.org
3Social policies and data, Benefits and Wages: OECD Indicators. http://www.oecd.
org/social/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagesoecdindicators.htm. Accessed on
August 26, 2012.
4For regular employment, there are 8 basis indicators (notification procedures, delay
involved before notice can start, length of the notice period, severance pay, definition
of justified or unfair dismissal, length of trial period, and compensation following unfair
dismissal). For temporary workers, there are 6 basis indicators (valid cases for use of
Fixed-Term Contracts (FTC), maximum number of successive FTCs, maximum cumu-
lated duration of successive FTCs, types of work for which Temporary Work Agency
(TWA) employment is legal, restrictions on the number of renewals, and maximum
cumulated duration of TWA contracts). See “Calculating summary indicators of em-
ployment protection strictness” (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/40/42740190.pdf)
for details of these measures.
5 “[D]egree of consensus between the collective bargaining partners” (OECD 1997).
6Pattern setting is a type of arrangement in which representative employers and
unions act as de-facto leaders and their agreements are taken as a pattern for all nego-
tiations in the same industry.
7We estimated a country fixed-effects model.exploiting within-country variation of
labor-market institutions. The lack of sufficient within-country variation prevents us
from making precise inferences.Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Policy is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors declare
that they have observed these principles.Acknowledgements
We thank Naohito Abe, Julen Esteban-Pretel, Makoto Saito, EtsuroShioji, Kotaro Tsuru, David Neumark, and seminar
participants at Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry and Hitotsubashi University for their comments. This
research is financially supported by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japanese
Government and Japan Society of Promotion for Science.
Responsible editor: David Neumark.
Author details
1Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry, Tokyo Center for Economics Research, Institute for the Study of
Labor (IZA), Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan. 2Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan.
Received: 8 September 2012 Accepted: 25 October 2012
Published: 24 December 2012
Kawaguchi and Murao IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012, 1:10 Page 22 of 22
http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/10References
Alba-Ramirez A (1995) Cross-Country Differences in Cyclical Variations of Male Teenage Employment.
Econ Letters 48(3-4):419–26
Atkinson AB, Micklewright J (1991) Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review.
J Econ Lit 29(4):1679–727
Autor DH, Duggan MG (2003) The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment. Quart J Econ 118
(1):157–205
Bertola G, Blau F, Khan L (2007) Labor Market Institutions and Demographic Employment Patterns. J Population Econ
20(4):833–67
Black D, Daniel K, Sanders S (2002) The Impact of Economic Conditions on Participation in Disability Programs:
Evidence from the Coal Boom and Bust. Amer Econ Rev 92(1):27–50
Blanchard O, Wolfers J (2000) The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The
Aggregate Evidence. Econ J 110(462):C1–33
Bratsberg B, Fevang E, Røed K (2010) Disability in the Welfare State: An Unemployment Problem in Disguise?., IZA DP.
http://ftp.iza.org/dp4897.pdf. Accessed 26 Oct 2012
Calmfors L, Driffill J (1988) Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance. Econ Pol 3(6):13–61
Canziani P, Petrongolo B (2001) Firing Costs and Stigma: A Theoretical Analysis and Evidence from Microdata.
Europ Econ Rev 45(10):1877–906
Card D, Lemieux T, Riddell WC (2003) Unions and the Wage Structure. In: Addison JT, Schnabel C (eds) International
Handbook of Trade Unions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 246–92
Clark KB, Summers LH (1981) Demographic Differences in Cyclical Employment Variation. J Human Res 16(1):61–79
Driffill J (2006) The Centralization of Wage Bargaining Revisited: What Have We Learnt? J Common Market Stud
44:731–56
Filardo AJ (1997) Cyclical Implications of the Declining Manufacturing Employment Share. Econ Rev (Q II):63–87
Genda Y, Kondo A, Ohta S (2010) Long-Term Effects of a Recession at Labor Market Entry in Japan and the United
States. J Human Res 45(1)
Gomme P, Rogerson R, Rupert P, Wright R (2005) The Business Cycle and the Life Cycle. In: Gertler M, Rogoff K (eds)
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004, Volume 19. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, pp 415–592
Jaimovich N, Siu HE (2009) The Young, the Old, and the Restless: Demographics and Business Cycle Volatility. Amer
EconRev 99(3):804–26
Kahn LM (2007) The Impact of Employment Protection Mandates on Demographic Temporary Employment Patterns:
International Microeconomic Evidence. Econ J 117(521):333–56
Korenman S, Neumark D (2000) Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets (a Cross-National Analysis). In: Blanchflower
DG, Freeman RB (eds) Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced Countries. University of Chicago Press,
pp 57–106
Lazear EP (1990) Job Security Provisions and Employment. Quart J Econ 105(3):699–726
Lee J (2000) The Robustness of Okun's Law: Evidence from Oecd Countries. J Macroecon 22(2):331–56
Leonor M (2008) Unions, Firing Costs, and Unemployment. Labour 22(3):509–46
Neumark D (2002) Youth Labor Markets in the United States: Shopping around Vs. Staying Put. Rev Econ Statist
84(3):462–82
Nickell S (1997) Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe Versus North America. J Econ Perspect 11(3):55–74
Nickell S, Nunziata L (2000) Employment Patterns in Oecd Countries. CEP Discussion Papers. Centre for Economic
Performance, LSE
Nickell W (2006) The Cep-Oecd Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). CEP Discussion Papers. Centre for Economic
Performance, LSE
OECD (1994) Oecd Employment Outlook 1994. OECD Publishing, Paris
OECD (1997) Oecd Employment Outlook 1997. OECD Publishing, Paris
Pilat D, Cimper A, Olsen KB, Webb C (2006) The Changing Nature of Manufacturing in Oecd Economies, OECD Science,
Technology and Industry Working Papers. OECD Publishing
Rege M, Telle K, Votruba M (2009) The Effect of Plant Downsizing on Disability Pension Utilization. J Europ Econ Assoc
7(4):754–85
Rios-Rull JV (1996) Life-Cycle Economies and Aggregate Fluctuations. Rev Econ Stud 63(3):465–89
Rodriguez-Palenzuela D, Jimeno-Serrano JF (2002) Youth Unemployment in the Oecd: Demographic Shifts; Labour
Market Institutions, and Macroeconomic Shock. Working Paper Series. European Central Bank
Shimer R (2001) The Impact of Young Workers on the Aggregate Labor Market. Quart J Econ 116(3):969–1007
Wachter TV, Bender S (2006) In the Right Place at the Wrong Time: The Role of Firms and Luck in Young Workers.
Amer Econ Rev 96(5):1679–705
Welch F (1979) Effects of Cohort Size on Earnings: The Baby Boom Babies' Financial Bust. J Polit Econ 87(5):S65–97doi:10.1186/2193-9004-1-10
Cite this article as: Kawaguchi and Murao: Who bears the cost of the business cycle? Labor-market institutions
and volatility of the youth unemployment rate. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012 1:10.
